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If someone knows something then there is something in virtue of which she knows it; and if 
someone justifiably believes something then there is something in virtue of which she is 
justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more 
controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing 
something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in 
non-epistemic respects. That is, our instantiating of epistemic properties depends on our 
instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic 
dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has 
significant consequences.  
In the first part of this paper, the dependence approach is contrasted with what I shall 
call ‘the necessary and sufficient condition project’the project of attempting to give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s knowing something or being justified in 
believing it. Although statements of the goal of uncovering necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge or justification are often to be found in the first few pages of 
epistemology textbooks, I have yet to find an articulation or defense of the project to take 
as an explicit target. It is usually briefly stated, in passing, as if it were obvious, before 
moving on. So I will proceed by advancing the dependence approach forthrightly, and, 
only after that will I argue for the advantages of that approach over the necessary and 
sufficient conditions project. That is the first part of the paper. In the second part, I argue 
that non-defeat is not part of that on which epistemic properties depend. My views and 
arguments in this part are in agreement with some aspects of Jonathan Dancy’s views and 
arguments, although I do not go quite as far as his ‘particularism’. In the third part, I 
explore one important consequence of the focus on epistemic/non-epistemic dependence, 
which is the multiple realization of epistemic properties in non-epistemic propertiesa 
result that has significant consequences for many familiar topics in epistemology. In the 
fourth and last part, I briefly consider other epistemic properties (such as understanding, 
wisdom and intelligence), and at the interrelation of different epistemic properties. I probe 
epistemic structure. Crucial claims will be defended, but some of this paper, especially the 
last part, is exploratory.  
§1.  Epistemic/Non-epistemic Dependence and Necessity
§1.1  Epistemic Notions
Before we consider the epistemic/non-epistemic dependence relation and the fertile 
consequences of making it the focus of epistemological enquiry, we should note the 
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epistemic relata that stand in the dependence relation. We should be aware of, and even 
wary of, the variety of epistemic phenomena.  
 A popular object of philosophical enquiry is knowledge. Many ask what it is. Some 
ask what explains it. Others ask why we want or value it. But there are important prior 
questions about the logical form of knowledge ascriptions. Clearly, knowledge must have 
an intentional objectthere must be something we know. In many cases it has a 
propositional intentional objectsuch as that birds fly or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon 
or that I exist. But we may also know a thing, such as John or Rome. And we may know 
how to swim or fly. And there may be other kinds of intentional objects of knowledge. It is 
far from clear that any kind of intentional object of knowledge should take precedence in 
our thinking about knowledge. Furthermore, kinds of knowledge may be structured in that 
some may depend on and include others. For example, perhaps propositional knowledge 
includes the knowledge-how that is part of possessing the concepts that figure in 
propositions known. At any rate, the minimal moral is that we need to be conscious of the 
plurality of kinds of knowledge.  
 Another issue is this. Contemporary epistemologists tend to focus on knowledge and 
justified belief. But we can ask: why do we have these two epistemological notions? Are 
there others? Possible candidates are understanding or wisdom or intelligence (Kvanvig 
2003). These are neither knowledge nor justified belief, but separate epistemic notions. 
This raises several questions: how many of such notions do we have? Why do we have the 
notions we do? How many should we have? Should any of these notions take precedence in 
our thinking? How are knowledge, justification and the other epistemic notions related to 
each other? Are some more basic than others?  
 Here I shall follow the standard practice among analytic philosophers of focusing on 
propositional knowledge and the justification of propositional belief. But it must be 
acknowledged that this focus may lead us to overlook important questions about the 
objects of knowledge, justification and other epistemic notions. We should be alert to the 
possibility that focusing on propositional knowledge and justified belief, to the exclusion 
of other kinds of knowledge and other epistemic notions, distorts what we say about 
propositional knowledge and justified belief. My suspicion is that what we say about 
propositional knowledge and justified belief should fit with a more general theory—but I 
shall not pursue this here.  
 
§1.2  Epistemic/Non-epistemicDependence 
 
Let us begin with knowledge. Whatever kind of object of knowledge is in 
question—propositions, objects, and so on—there is a fundamental principle of 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence: knowledge cannot be bare in the same sense that 
evaluative properties quite generally cannot hold barely. As I noted at the beginning of this 
paper, if someone knows something then there must be something in virtue of which she 
knows it, just as if an action is bad then there must be something about the action in virtue 
of which it is bad (Zangwill 2006, 2008). A person cannot know barely, any more than she 
3 
 
can be barely bad.1 
 We should distinguish between full and partial dependence. For example, knowledge 
may depend on belief, but belief is only part of the whole that is the full basis of 
knowledge. I shall use ‘maker’ to denote the full dependence basis, and say that where 
there is knowledge, there is a ‘knowledge-maker’. When we say that a person knows or is 
bad because of how she is in other respects, we have in mind full dependence.   
 Since dependence is central, we should ask what dependence is, or what kind of 
dependence is in question. The notion we need for epistemology is fact dependence, which 
is sometimes called 'explanatory dependence': the relata of the dependence relation are 
facts or states of affairssomeone’s having knowledge, for example. (I take facts to be 
property instantiations<<<???negative/Universal facts??>>>.) We can distinguish fact and 
object dependence even though objects are constituents of facts. Fact dependence is a very 
basic idea, one not plausibly reducible to other ideas. It is like identity in this respect.2 
 I shall avoid using the word ‘ground’ to indicate the relation between epistemic and 
non-epistemic facts and properties, and normative and non-normative facts and properties 
more generally. First, the word ‘ground’ has an established use in epistemology, meaning 
something like a person’s reason for belief; so using the same word for the 
epistemic/non-epistemic relation would be confusing. Second, even if we talk of grounds 
we still need to distinguish full and partial grounds, as we did for dependence; so there is no 
gain in clarity there. Third, some theorists of grounds think that grounds implies 
necessitation (for instance Fine 2012). If so, it cannot be the relation we need if the 
dependence relation between epistemic and non-epistemic properties and facts turns out to 
be contingent. By contrast, the metaphysical dependence relation, like causal dependence, 
has no such association. (For a useful guide to issues specific to grounding, see Audi 2012.)  
 Much epistemology, in my view, can be construed, or perhaps reconstrued, as an 
attempt to say what knowledge depends on. This applies to propositional knowledge, 
objectual knowledge, and any other kinds of knowledge that there are. My suspicion is that 
it is because of the fundamentality of the idea of epistemic/non-epistemic dependence that 
epistemologists went in search of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. But 
that is not the same thing. What is crucial is dependencethat we know or justifiably 
believe, or understand, or are intelligent in virtue of, or because of, something else.  
 It is also plausible that this principle of epistemic/non-epistemic dependence is 
known a priori, like the principles of moral and aesthetic dependence; but this 
meta-epistemic matter will not be important here. 
 I take the epistemic/non-epistemic dependence relation not to be a special epistemic 
kind of dependence but rather the dependence, of a familiar kind, of epistemic facts 
(epistemic property instantiations) on non-epistemic facts (property instantiations). It is 
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one of the relata of the relation that is epistemic, not the relation itself. (I here depart from 
Fine 2012 who invokes a specifically normative kind of dependence.) There may be a 
variety of dependence relations, but the one that I have in mind is non-symmetrical and 
non-reflexive. It is controversial whether or not the relation is transitive. My view is that it 
is not, as we shall see.   
 Since the work of Kit Fine it is now widely accepted that the notion of dependence 
cannot be explicated in modal terms (Fine 1995; see also Lowe 2009). Dependence stands 
in a complex relation to necessitation, but it is a distinct relation (for all but a revisionary 
Humean). One example, concerning objects, is this: necessarily Socrates exists if and only 
if the singleton set {Socrates} exists; but Socrates does not depend for his existence on the 
set. This shows that the necessitation relation is not the dependence relation. Another 
example is thisand the example is better for our purposes, first, because it is an example 
of fact dependence rather than object dependence, and second because it is an example of 
normative property dependence: necessarily if something is good then God does (or would 
if He existed) approve of it; but many hold that in spite of that a thing is not good because 
God approves (or would approve) of it. So sufficiency is not sufficient for dependence. 
There can be necessary connections without dependence.  
 One immediate way that this impacts on epistemology is this. The fact that 2+2=4 
holds in all possible worlds in which X knows that grass is green. But the knowledge that 
grass is green does not even partly depend on the fact that 2+2=4 (even though necessarily 
if someone knows that grass is green then 2+2=4). Furthermore, being a member of the set 
of instances of knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge, but it is not even 
partly what knowledge depends on. A set is an abstract object, outside space and time with 
no causal powers. Knowledge is not. They are distinct existences. Nevertheless, being a 
member of the knowledge set is necessary and sufficient for having knowledge. So 
something can be necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge without making for 
knowledge.  
 
§1.3  Contingent Epistemic Dependence 
 
The distinction between dependence and necessitation also allows another possibility, 
which is particularly important in the metaphysics of normative properties, such as moral 
or epistemic properties: a dependency relation need not accompany a necessitation 
relation. In many cases, dependency relations explain necessitation relations. For example, 
water is necessarily H2O because water depends on H2O and because it is essentially H2O. 
But in other cases, there are dependency relations where the things or facts related do not 
stand in necessitation relations. (Just as there can be necessities without dependencies, as 
the Socrates/{Socrates} example showed, so there can be dependencies without 
necessities.) 
 An example would be causal dependence, which only amounts to necessitation in 
theories that are Humean in characterthat is, in theories that eliminate the idea of causal 
dependency in favor of the modal notion. Causal relations are intuitively contingent. If an 
egg breaks because it was dropped onto the ground, there is nothing necessary about that, 
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unless we just stipulate that causation is a special kind of necessity, as a matter of 
definition. In the familiar strict, or metaphysical, sense of necessity, causal relations are not 
necessary. Negative events like Superman’s not intervening are not part of what caused a 
dropped egg to break. His non-appearance is a necessary condition for the breaking, but 
that does not make it a cause. So the egg’s being dropped is a cause of its breaking without 
being a sufficient condition for its breaking. Are there an indefinite number of negative 
causes for every causal relation between two events? Surely not. So causes do not suffice 
for effects. It is true that we sometimes select part of the total cause, and say that it is ‘the’ 
cause, because of our interests. But that does not affect the point that causation is not 
necessitation, for even in these cases, we are typically only selecting part of the total cause. 
It remains implausible that the multitude of negative events that are necessary for the effect 
are part of the cause. I am not suggesting that negative events are never causes (see 
Schaffer 2004), only that many negative events are not causes. In many or most cases, 
causation is positively bringing something about. Negative necessary conditions are 
something else entirely. Moreover, since many negative facts are not causes, the 
conjunction of all the negative facts that are necessary for the effect is not one of the overall 
causes.  
 What about moral/non-moral dependence? Someone might do something morally 
wrong in virtue of lying, without it being wrong partly in virtue of the failure to obtain of 
all the possible defeaters (such as it being necessary to save a life), which would have, but 
did not, make it alright to lie on that occasion. The non-obtaining of all the possible 
defeaters does not make the act wrong in the way the lying does, even though both are 
necessary conditions for the wrongness. (Michael Stocker and Jonathan Dancy have 
argued this; see Stocker 1970, Dancy 2004.) This shows that the wrong-making relation is 
not a necessitation (sufficiency) relation. Moral/non-moral dependence is contingentFNon 
(see also Zangwill 2008). 
 Similarly for knowledge. Someone might know that Tom stole a book from a library 
partly in virtue of having a perceptual experience as of someone looking like Tom stealing 
a book in the library. This may be so even though there are many possible but non-actual 
defeaters. Tom might have an identical twin who was in the same library on the same day. 
Or the library might be in fake book country. The perceiver might have taken a 
hallucinogenic drug (Dancy 2004: 74). And so on, indefinitely. There are countless such 
possible defeaters, which in normal cases do not obtain, and if they did, the person would 
not know.3 But when they do not obtain, the fact that they do not obtain is not part of what 
makes that case knowledge. No, the person knows Tom stole the book partly because she 
had the perceptual experiences that she did. That is a knowledge-maker. And we can add 
others, such as belief and fact. But the overall knowledge-maker (the conjunction of all the 
partial knowledge-makers) does not suffice for knowledge, because all of the possible 
                                                 
3 There may be a second-order negative clause quantifying over non-defeat properties, such 
that there are no defeaters, or no undefeated defeaters. But that second-order property can only 
have the status of the first-order non-defeat properties than are its disjunctions. <<<???last 
sentence is cryptic???>>> 
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defeaters must also not obtain. It would be bizarre to say that the non-obtaining of any or all 
those possible defeaters is a knowledge-maker in the way that the fact that she had an 
experience as of Tom stealing the book is a knowledge-maker.4 If so, 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence, like all normative/non-normative dependence, is 
contingent dependence. This claim will be defended in section 2. 
 
§1.4  Three Comments 
 
( A ) Gettier Liberation: 
The liberation afforded by the turn to dependence, can be illustrated by considering a 
consequenceone that may shock your philosophical grandmotherwhich is that 
possible and actual ‘Gettier’ cases, of justified true belief that are not knowledge, do not 
show that someone does not know something merely in virtue of having justified true 
belief, either in a particular case, or quite generally (Gettier 1963). Knowledge might hold 
entirely in virtue of justified true belief, despite Gettier cases. When “is” stands for the 
dependence relation, or constitution, as it often does,5 then we can say that Gettier cases do 
not show that justified true belief is not knowledge! This is a consequence of distinguishing 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence from necessitationthat is, what makes for 
knowledge need not suffice for knowledge.6 
 This is not just a minor point about Gettier, because much epistemology in the last 
half a century has been pursued as a self-consciously post-Gettier project. But if the 
dependence approach is correct, a mistake was made in the diagnosis of the Gettier 
examples, which was to see them as telling us about what the nature of knowledge is. The 
post-Gettier project of searching for necessary and sufficient conditions, even when that 
project was conceived as a ‘naturalized’ one, and even if the relevant conditions were 
allowed to be ‘external’ ones, was nevertheless infected with the root mistaken idea that the 
pursuit of necessary and sufficient conditions illuminates the nature of knowledge. As I 
pointed out, that would make being a member of the knowledge set into what knowledge 
is, because it is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. We might I suppose grudgingly 
concede that Gettier cases show that justified true belief is not necessary and sufficient for 
knowledge. But that negative thesis does not invite more interesting negative theses, and it 
does not encourage the pursuit of necessary and sufficient conditions as a way of 
understanding knowledge. Even though being a member of the knowledge set is indeed 
necessary and sufficient for knowledge, that is completely unenlightening and does not 
                                                 
4 Another example might be a priori knowledge. Perhaps a priori knowledge does not depend 
on perceptual experience even though if we had no perceptual experience we would not have a 
priori knowledge.  
5 Consider what is called ‘reduction’. Philosophers often want to say that X reduces to Y 
(water to H2O for example). This is supposed to be an asymmetrical relation, but it is one that is 
often expressed by saying that water ‘is’ H2O despite the asymmetry of the relation, which proves 
that it is not identity.  
6 For similarly thoughts see Chudnuff 2011. Thanks to a referee for alerting me this paper.  
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satisfy any thirst to understand knowledge. Hence it is not the case that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions project should be pursued alongside the dependence project. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions project was a complete mistake and the only thing to do 
with it is to jettison it, not accommodate it.  
 
( B ) Transitivity: 
There are quite a few important formal issues over both dependence and the grounding 
relation; and the issues deserve more discussion than I can give here. (Those bearing on 
‘grounding’ have been dealt with extensively in Correia and Schnieder 2012; see also 
Rodriguez‐Pereyra 2016.) Of these formal issues concerning dependence, transitivity, or 
rather the lack of it, seems to me to be a very important issue, with ramifications in 
epistemology and elsewhere. It is intuitive that epistemic properties depend (wholly or in 
part) on mental states, but it is far from intuitive that epistemic properties depend (wholly 
or in part) on neural states, even if mental states depend (wholly or in part) on neural states. 
This, in my view, is a plausible counter-example to the transitivity of the dependence 
relation.7 Of course if dependence were cashed out in modal terms, then the relation would 
obviously be transitive (since the inclusion relation between sets of possible worlds is 
transitive). But one of the corollaries of resisting that reduction is that transitivity does not 
follow trivially, and indeed its main rationale drops away. Once one abandons the 
reduction there should be no presumption in favor of transitivity.  
  One way to retain transitivity in the face of this example would be to claim that the 
two dependence relations are not of the same kind. If they are of the same kind, transitivity 
fails. If not, it may hold. In order for the transitivist and the intransitivist to have a 
meaningful debate, they need to agree on a way of categorizing kinds of dependence 
relations so that we can tell when we do and when we do not have dependence relations of 
the same kind. The dependence of norms on mind and the dependence of mind on matter 
seem to be of the same kind, and there is no reason to think that they are different in such a 
way that transitivity is preserved. The dependence relations certainly seem similar. For 
example, there are no formal differences between these dependence relations. I have not 
proved this here. But it is clear that the onus of proof lies with those who think that the two 
dependence relations are different (as Fine thinks) rather than merely having different 
relata (as I think). Intransitivism is the most plausible default view. 
<<<???trasnsition awkward. Rephrase first two sentences.??>>> 
 It is plausible that transitivity holds within categories. But it may fail where we go 
across categories. For example, if A is morally good because B is morally good, and B is 
morally good because C is morally good, then A is morally good because C is morally 
good. And it is plausible that if A is known because B is known, and B is known because C 
is known, then A is known because C is known. Agreed. That does not show that it is 
plausible that if x has knowledge or is good, because of certain of x’s mental states, and 
those mental states hold because of x’s brain states, then x has knowledge or is good 
                                                 
7 Jonathan Schaffer has questioned the transitivity of grounding in Schaffer 2010; but his 
examples are quite different from the one that I raise here. 
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because of x’s brain states (see further Zangwill 2013b). 
 
( C ) Epistemic Non-factualism: 
When I introduced epistemic/non-epistemic dependence, I assumed the reality of epistemic 
properties such as someone's having knowledge or being justified in believing something 
or being wise. I assumed that these are real properties of a person that she has in virtue of 
having psychological or other states and standing in relations. This means that I am tacitly 
rejecting epistemic non-factualism. On Hartry Field’s view, there are no epistemic 
properties to depend on anything (Field 2009). His view is analogous to expressivist 
non-factualist views in moral philosophy. Nevertheless, even such a non-factualist needs a 
surrogate of epistemic/non-epistemic dependence, in the way that Simon Blackburn tries 
to explain and justify our commitment to moral supervenience (Blackburn 1985). An 
epistemic non-factualist needs to explain and justify our operating with the principle of 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence in our epistemic thought. Although epistemic 
non-factualism is a negative metaphysical doctrine, in its most plausible versions, it strives 
not to be revisionary about actual epistemic thought. For a non-factualist, there are no 
epistemic facts to depend on other facts; but we speak and think as if there are, and that 
needs to be explained, and we speak and think as if epistemic/non-epistemic dependence 
obtains, and that also needs to be explained. In fact there are strong arguments against 
epistemic non-factualism; in particular a self-refutation argument can be run against it. (I 
pursue this in Zangwill 2010, section VII).). But assuming that non-factualism is not 
self-defeating, it needs to try to respect our commitment to epistemic/non-epistemic 
dependence. So epistemic/non-epistemic dependence is still important for a non-factualist 
view. 
 
§2.  Non-Defeaters??? as Makers? 
 
§2.1  Dependence and Non-Defeaters??? 
 
Thus far I have described the distinction between the making and the necessitation of 
epistemic facts, and I have pointed to some consequences of the distinction. However, how 
could we argue that not being defeated is not a maker of knowledge against someone who 
claimed that it was? (See Lehrer and Paxton 1979, for example.)  
In many cases, having a perceptual experience (with content p) is part of what makes 
for knowledge (that p). An example of a defeater, which I have already mentioned, would 
be that one’s experience is a product of having taken a hallucinogenic drug. If so, one does 
not know.8 The question is whether, in a normal case, where I have not taken a 
hallucinogenic drug, that negative fact is part of makes for perceptual knowledge.  
 A strong viewwhich is not necessary for this paper but which I think plausibleis 
that non-defeat is never a knowledge-maker. That is, for any case of knowledge, and for 
any possible defeater of it, not being defeated in that way is always merely a necessary 
                                                 
8 So if there were such a thing as epistemic logic, it would have to be non-monotonic. 
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condition for knowledge and never a knowledge-maker. A weaker view, which is at issue 
here, is that for any case of knowledge, there are some non-defeaters that are necessary 
conditions but not makers for that knowledge.  
 
 
§2.2  A Metaphysical Argument 
 
In favor of the strong view there is the following metaphysical argument, which draws on a 
general distinction between positive and negative facts. There are positive facts and there 
are negative facts, and they are different. The makers of positive facts (that on which they 
depend) must be other positive facts. While negative facts may be necessary conditions of 
positive facts they cannot be among their makers. For example, the fact that something is 
blue may have makers, but no negative fact such as its not being orange, nor not being any 
disjunction of color properties, can ever be a maker of a thing’s being blueeven though 
lacking that negative property (or disjunction of negative properties) is a necessary 
condition of being blue. Even possessing an infinite disjunction of all the other colors apart 
from some specific shade of blue does not make a thing that shade of blue. It obviously 
does not suffice for it. For God and numbers instantiate the complex negative disjunctive 
property without being blue. But it is also plausible that not having the disjunctive property 
does not, even in part, make for blueness. Being blue is a positive state of a thing and no 
amount of negativity by itself can generate it.   
 Knowledge seems similar. The fact that someone knows something is a positive fact. 
So positive facts must be the makers of knowledge. Any non-defeat property, like not 
having taken a hallucinogenic drug, is a negative property; so it does not make for 
knowledge. And no conjunction or disjunction of negative properties of a person could be a 
maker for positively having knowledge. 
 <<<It is consistent with this that there can be positive facts that defeat a defeater, such 
as having taken an antidote for a hallucinogenic drug, which is a necessary condition but 
not a knowledge-maker. Such cases show that not all merely necessary conditions of 
knowing are negative. Defeater defeaters may be positive. But this is consistent with 
knowledge only having positive makers. It does not help to show that non-defeat is a maker 
of knowledge. That view need not deny that there are some positive necessary conditions 
that are not makers.>>>Move to footnote.>>>  
 I like this metaphysical argument; but it does presuppose a not uncontroversial 
metaphysical view of negative properties. I think the general metaphysical view is 
plausible and defensible, and I have pursued the matter elsewhere (see Zangwill 2011), but 
not everyone accepts it.   
 <<from here??>> 
 Furthermore, there is the problem that sometimes we know negative facts; and in 
those cases the negative fact itself is a knowledge-maker.9 I have said that belief and fact 
are among the makers of knowledge. So some negative facts must be among the makers of 
                                                 
9 Thanks to a referee for raising this objection. 
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knowledge of negative facts. This means that the strong claim that negative facts are never 
among the makers of knowledge is false. That leaves open the claim that non-defeaters are 
never knowledge-makers. Nevertheless the case for that claim cannot be merely that 
non-defeat facts are negative factsfor some negative facts are makers of knowledge. The 
claim about non-defeat still has some intuitive plausibility, but we have not yet found a 
rationale for it. Is there some way that we can somehow negotiate the case of negative 
knowledge? One thing that could be said is that knowledge of a negative fact is not a purely 
positive state but is a hybrid state. On this view, while knowledge of positive facts only has 
positive makers, knowledge of negative facts has both positive and negative makers. Even 
so, we have lost the rationale for claiming that non-defeat is never a maker. 
 
§2.3  Do Our Epistemic Practices Favor Negative Makers?  
 
Another??? way to try to argue that non-defeat is not a maker for epistemic facts is to 
appeal to our practices of epistemic attribution. 
 In the case of causal judgments, we isolate causal factors, which are parts of the total 
cause, depending on our interests. Call ‘egalitarians’ those who do not discriminate makers 
from necessitators. Egalitarians might say: why not hold a similar pragmatic view of 
knowledge attributions? The view would be that we select parts of the knowledge-maker 
that interest us. We should concede that we sometimes select part of the total maker of 
knowledge because of our interests. The question is whether, whatever our interests, the 
whole that is the full maker, includes non-defeat facts.  
 It is true that we sometimes take non-defeat into account in attributing knowledge. So 
it might be argued that we do not discriminate between makers and non-defeaters in 
knowledge-attribution. If so, the practice of knowledge-attribution does not vindicate the 
non-maker status of non-defeaters. But this argument confuses the epistemology of 
epistemology with the metaphysics of epistemology. The fact that we need to take 
something into account in attributing knowledge does not show that it is part of what 
makes for knowledge. But how to show that it is not? 
 Another??? argument would be that if we compare one person who knows something 
with another person who does not know the same thing, it might be that what is a maker is 
one case is defeated in the other case. Hence, it might be argued that not being defeated 
partly explains why there is knowledge in the first case, unlike the second. But even though 
one person lacks knowledge due to the defeat property being instantiated, and even though 
the difference between the two is the instantiation or lack of instantiation of the defeat 
property, it does not follow that what makes for knowledge, in the successful case, is the 
lack of defeat. Compare: X is 7 foot tall, and Y is 5 foot tall. That explains why X is taller 
than Y. But that difference between X and Y is not part of what it is for X to be 7 foot tall. 
Similarly, what makes for knowledge in one case might be defeated in some other case, but 
that is another case and does not bear on what makes for knowledge in the first case.10 
 It might be said that a detective might come to know who did the crime by ruling out 
                                                 
10 Jonathan Dancy relentlessly objects to this form of argument in Dancy 1995 and 2004. 
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suspects, which is something negative. But the action of ruling out suspects is a positive 
maker. Similarly, the fact that someone believes that her knowledge is not defeated may be 
a knowledge-maker; but, again, that it is a positive fact about a person. In that case, it is not 
non-defeat that is doing the epistemic work but beliefs about non-defeat. It is true that 
failing to rule out suspects might be a maker for lacking knowledge. That is a negative 
non-epistemic fact that makes for a negative epistemic fact. We are interested in negative 
non-epistemic makers for positive epistemic facts.  
 But to argue against these arguments is not to give a positive argument to the effect 
that non-defeaters are not knowledge-makers. 
<<<12-13 dialectic hard to follow??>>> 
 
§2.4  Epistemic Practices and the Appeal to Non-defeat 
 
Another??? argument is that if non-defeat were a maker, it would be common to find cases 
where knowledge is attributed just on the basis of non-defeat, by itself, in the way that we 
do sometimes say that someone knows something happened in virtue of having a certain 
visual experience. But we do not. We can put the point in terms of explanation. We cannot 
explain why someone knows solely by citing the fact that no hallucinogenic drugs were 
taken or that no identical twins were in the library that day.  <<to here??>> (There is a 
contrast in this respect with causation since we might well say that the purple skin marks 
were due to the lack of vitamin C.) By contrast, having a visual experience is part of 
knowing, and a positive part of knowing, which is why we may explain why someone 
knows by reference to her visual experience. Of course there is more to knowing that 
having a visual experience. But having a visual experience may be part of knowing. By 
contract, we do not attribute knowledge solely on the basis of non-defeat facts. That seems 
to show that, however it might be with the general metaphysics of negative facts, in 
epistemology, we do not take non-defeat negative facts to be makers of positive epistemic 
facts. If non-defeat negative properties were knowledge-makers, then they should often 
figure by themselves in our attributive practice in the way that positive factors alone often 
do. We often attribute knowledge on the basis of positive characteristics and we never, or 
almost never, do so on the basis of negative non-defeat facts alone. If negative non-defeat 
facts were among the makers of positive epistemic properties, that would be mysterious. It 
seems, then, that common sense attributive practice assumes that non-defeat properties are 
not makers of epistemic properties, at least in the way that many positive facts are. Folk 
epistemological practice discriminates against non-defeat, and a pragmatic story does not 
explain that away. Hence we do not take non-defeat properties to be makers for the 
instantiation of positive epistemic properties.   
  Perhaps we can imagine a scenario in which we might want to explain and attribute 
knowledge by non-defeat. However, for this we would need an unusual case in which 
defeat is the norm. For example, imagine that barn examples were the norm in the 
countryside. There are many clusters of fake barns with one real barn near the middle. But 
one cluster of barns is of only real barns. Then might we not explain the fact that someone 
knows she is looking at a barn, when she is looking at a real barn in the middle of an 
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unusual rare cluster of only real barns, by saying that her knowledge is not defeated, as it in 
most other cases? I concede that we might say that. Even so, what is the knowledge-maker 
in such a case? Whatever it is—perception, causation, reliability etc.—it is still intuitive 
that non-defeat is not a knowledge-maker. So this unusual case does not derail the 
argument that if non-defeat properties were makers, we would expect it to be common in 
actual knowledge ascriptions to appeal to non-defeat. In fact either we never do, or we do 
only in very unusual cases, such as a non-fake barn case in a largely fake-barn context, and 
even then, non-defeat does not seem to be a maker.  
  It might be objected that it is also true that we usually do not bother to mention 
belief and fact even though they are both knowledge-makers.11 A pragmatic explanation 
beckons here, like our not mentioning the presence of oxygen when we explain why a 
match being struck caused a flame. We usually assume the presence of oxygen as an 
obvious background condition in giving such an explanation. Why is non-defeat in 
knowledge ascriptions not like that? It is true that we hardly ever mention beliefs and facts 
in knowledge attributions even though they are makers and not mere necessitators<<wrong 
word>>. But this is because they are too obvious to mention, just as we do not mention the 
presence of oxygen when explaining why a match lighted by saying that it had been struck. 
But how to show that? The argument was that we do not mention non-defeat and we do 
mention perception, memory etc. because we mention makers and do not mention 
non-makers. But belief and fact are makers, not merely necessitators<<wrong word>>, yet 
we do not mention them. If we say that it is because they are obviously makers that it is not 
interesting to mention them, then we need to be able to distinguish cases where we do not 
mention because they are too obvious to be interesting, from cases where we do not 
mention some fact because it is only a necessary condition (what Dancy would call an 
‘enabler’). Without that distinction it could be that we do not mention non-defeat because it 
is an uninteresting obvious maker. 
 It could be that we do not mention non-defeat for the same reason that we do not 
mention belief and fact. But is it not obvious that there is a difference? One attempt to bring 
out the difference would be to point out that although both non-defeat and belief/fact give 
us counterfactuals with respect to knowledge that p, the belief that p and the fact that p each 
‘count in favor’ of knowledge (in Dancy’s terms), whereas non-defeat does not. What is 
‘counting in favor’?  Let us take it to imply, at least, increasing the probability of 
knowledge. Believing that p, or it being a fact that p, as opposed to not believing that p, or 
it not being a fact that p, make knowledge that p more likely. But instantiating a non-defeat 
property does not make knowledge that p more likely. The fact that the number 7 
instantiates some non-defeat property does not raise the probability that it knows 
something. (There is no probability of that.) Non-defeat lacks knowledge-efficacy in both 
cases. <<Referee not like. Favourers. Raising probability?>> 
 But to say this is to return to a metaphysical argument. 
 
2.5  ??Another Metaphysical Argument 
                                                 




There is something intuitively appealing about the idea that negative facts cannot be 
makers of positive facts, such as someone knowing something. But then we noted the 
problem of knowledge of negative facts. It is not that negative facts cannot be makers at all. 
Perhaps negative facts can be the makers of other negative facts, for example, someone’s 
being ignorant. Nevertheless, there is something particular about not-being defeated that 
makes it an unlikely candidate for being a maker of the positive fact of knowledge.  
I believe that we can appeal to what I call the ‘atomism of causal powers’ (Zangwill 
2011). By itself non-defeat has got nothing to do with knowledge. This is illustrated by the 
case of numbers, which instantiate non-defeat properties but do not and cannot know 
anything. (Radical skepticism about numerical epistemology is the right view; numbers do 
not and cannot know anything.) Non-defeat must combine with something positive. This 
contrasts with knowledge-makers like having perceptual experiences, which by themselves 
‘favor’ knowledge (to use Dancy’s word), in the probabilistic sense. The atomism of 
powers that counts against non-defeat facts being makers of knowledge. And this is so even 
if negative facts count in favor of knowledge in the case of knowledge of negative facts, 
and even if being defeated can be a maker of ignorance.  
 Suppose it were asked ‘Why is this act wrong?’ The reply cannot be ‘Well, it was not 
done to benefit starving children’. Only when stapled to a positive fact does a negative 
non-defeat fact have any explanatory role. (Maybe the number 7 also did not aim to feed 
starving children; but the number 7 did nothing wrong.) Similarly with non-defeat in 
epistemology. Only when negative facts, such as lacking hallucinations, or Tom being 
twinless, are stapled to positive facts, such as having certain experiences, can a negative 
non-defeat fact play an explanatory role with respect to knowledge. By itself non-defeat is 
not an ingredient in knowledge, as the case of the number 7 shows. Contrast the role of 
negative facts when we know negative facts. There the negative fact is by itself an 
ingredient in knowledge; it is partly constitutive of knowledge. To be that, it need not be 
conjoined with, positive facts.  
 Another?? metaphysical point is this: while we should not deny that negative facts, 
objects and events can be causes, ??there is a difference from positive causes<<English>>. 
In most case of positive causation, apart from some very basic physical causation, there is a 
mechanism in virtue of which the causal relation obtains (see Machamer, Darden and 
Craver 2000). For example, there is a molecular explanation of why a toaster exploded.12 
What exactly is? Let us take a mechanism to be either some intervening causal link 
between cause and effect or something in virtue of which the causal relation obtains. To 
illustrate: suppose we ask why a particular sheep is white. The answer is not that all sheep 
are white, even though that entails it. The thought is that some mechanism must be at work 
explaining the whiteness of this sheep. The universal fact is not even part of that 
explanation. What we need is something that makes the particular sheep white. We need 
                                                 
12 That is the reason we embrace an ideal of universal causal closure, which implies that there 




something similar in the case of knowledge.  
We should accept negative causation; and if so I even think that we should accept 
negative causal chains. But I balk at negative mechanisms. For example, there is a whole 
series of causal stages linking an inactive lifeguard with a drowning swimmer. There is a 
negative causal chain connecting the life-guard inactivity with the drowning swimmer. The 
life guard’s not diving into the water would be one link in the negative causal chain. But 
there is no mechanism mediating this negative causal connection. There would have to be 
too many of them, for one thing. Negative causality is ok; negative mechanisms are not. 
Jonathan Schaffer has convincingly argued that absences and negative facts can be part of 
mechanisms (Schaffer 2004). For example, the mechanism of a gun’s trigger combines 
positive with negative facts. But this mechanism is a combination of positive and negative 
facts. But an entirely negative mechanism mediating positive facts seems 
incomprehensible. Are there an indeterminate number of negative mechanisms 
corresponding to the indefinite number of non-defeaters for any causal relation? 
Superman’s not showing up may, in some sense, be part of the explanation of some event 
such as an egg breaking after having been dropped. Similarly Batman’s going on vacation 
may explain a surge in the crime rate in Gotham city. But unlike the gun trigger case, there 
is no mechanism in virtue of which Superman’s absence contributes to the breaking of the 
egg or Batman’s vacation contributes to the crime surge. Similarly a positive 
knowledge-maker holds in virtue of something, such as a visual experience; and there is 
more to be said about how the visual experience mediates between the fact and the belief 
when the person has knowledge. There are mechanisms of perception, and memory. But 
there are no mechanisms corresponding to the limitless number of negative facts, in 
particular non-defeat facts, which are necessary for a case of knowledge.  
 The exception to this are negative facts in cases of knowledge of negative facts. But 
this is an unusual case where the negative fact stands in a close metaphysical relation to a 
positive fact, which does stand in explanatory relation to our belief in the negative fact. For 
instance, we believe that something is not blue because we believe that it is red. In this case 
there is no need of a negative mechanism. I take it that we know negative facts by knowing 
positive facts and inferring the negative facts. This case is more like the case of the gun 
trigger.  
What is the argumentative step from mechanisms to makers? There is no 
mechanism corresponding to non-defeat. So it is not a maker of knowledge. But perception 
is part of a mechanism mediating belief and fact. That is why it is a maker. (Non-defeat is 
hardly like gravity in Newtonian mechanics, where there is no mechanism needed before 
the force is basic in the universe.) So non-defeat lacks the maker status of perception.  
 I conclude that the absence of defeaters is not a knowledge-maker. The absence of 
hallucination or evidence of hallucination is not a maker of knowledge like the presence a 
visual experiences. In a case where we think that someone knows something happened 
partly because she had certain visual experiences, the fact that she had the visual 
experience is not on an equal status with any or all the uncountable factors, which we have 
not even thought of, without which she would not know. If making were necessitating then 
they would be on a par. But they are not. If so, having a certain visual experience is part of 
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what makes for knowledge in a way that non-defeat is not. The necessitarian view of 
making erases this difference. The view is too egalitarian. Necessitarians are egalitarians, 
and that is what is wrong with them.  
 Note that the arguments of this section support the strong claim that not being 
defeated is never a maker. However, this paper only requires the weaker claim that not all 
non-defeat properties are part of the overall knowledge-maker. We might in principle 
allow that some non-defeat properties are makers, so long as the conjunction of all of them 
is not a necessary part of a whole that is not just a sufficient condition but also a 
knowledge-maker (compare Mackie 1965).  
 Note also that since non-defeat is not a knowledge-maker, despite being a necessary 





§3.  Multiple Realization 
 
§3.1  Multiple Realization and Dependence 
 
Let us now turn to consider the impact of the dependence/necessitation distinction on a 
number of issues in epistemology. Probably the most far-reaching consequence of 
foregrounding epistemic/non-epistemic dependence arises from the possibility and 
actuality of what in the philosophy of mind is called ‘multiple realization’. The principle of 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence means that where there is knowledge, there is a 
knowledge-makerbut there is no reason to expect a common kind of knowledge-maker 
in different cases. Just as one act may be bad in virtue of offending rights and another may 
be bad in virtue of causing needless pain and another in virtue of betraying a family loyalty, 
so different cases of knowledge need not have a similar kind of knowledge-maker. I take 
multiple realization to conjoin the positive idea that one kind of fact depends on another, 
with the negative idea that the first kind of fact may depend on many different facts of the 
second kind.13 Much epistemology, by contrast, assumes a reductionist understanding of 
the knowledge-making relation, so that all cases of knowledge are thought to have a similar 
kind of knowledge-maker. (See for example Audi 1988, chapter 7.) 
 This is unwarranted, or at least unargued. It is manifest in the way that 
counter-examples are supposed to function where we are examining the idea that some X 
makes for knowledge, and then a case is cited of something which is knowledge but not X; 
this is supposed to show that the original case was not knowledge in virtue of being X. To 
take one example of many, Paul Moser writes: “Knowledge is not just true belief. Some 
true beliefs are supported merely by lucky guesswork and they are not knowledge” (Moser 
2002, p. 4). But perhaps some other true beliefs are knowledge. Why generalize from the 
                                                 
13 This notion of ‘multiple realization’ does not imply a commitment to identities between 
epistemic properties and second-order causal properties.  
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lucky guess case? This ubiquitous move is predicated on the denial of multiple realization. 
It could be, for example, that one case of knowledge holds in virtue of being formed by a 
reliable process while another holds in virtue of being justified. They might even have the 
same or similar contents despite being known in different ways, in the sense of being 
knowledge in virtue of different knowledge-makers.  
 Epistemologists sometimes allow that knowledge may have varied 'sources', such as 
perception, testimony, introspection, memory, reason (Audi 1988). Is this the acceptance 
of multiple realization? No, for the idea is usually that there is one feature that always 
makes for knowledge, such as reliability or justification, and then the sourcesperception, 
testimony, introspection, memory and reasonare various ways that a belief has that 
featurebeing reliably formed or justified or whatever. It is assumed that there is one 
common feature in virtue of which these are all sources of knowledge.  
 Is there nothing general we can say about what knowledge depends on? There seems 
to be no objection to the standard view that the belief that p and the fact that p are always 
part of what makes for the knowledge that p in every case.14 In standard epistemology, 
belief and fact are thought to be necessary conditions but not sufficient conditions of 
knowledge, since there are some examples of belief and fact that are not knowledge. But 
this way of looking at things, or proceeding, or arguing, is questionable. What we can say is 
that in many cases, belief and fact are not all that makes for knowledge. Epistemology may 
be conceived in part as the quest for a more complete knowledge-maker in those cases, 
even if we do not conceive of that as the quest for sufficient conditions for knowledge in 
every case. Consider the common question: what else suffices for the knowledge that p 
besides the true belief that p? Let us rephrase that in the light of the idea of 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence and replacing facts for truth: what else does 
knowledge depend on besides belief and fact? But this question is objectionable if it 
assumes that there is a general answer. Although in many cases it is true that more is 
needed for knowledge beside belief and fact, it is possible that in some cases, belief and 
fact are all that knowledge depends on. Knowledge of Wittgensteinian ‘hinge’ 
propositionssuch as that there is an external worldare not implausible candidates 
(Wittgenstein 1967). The fact that the knowledge-maker includes more than belief and fact 
in some cases does not show that there are not some other cases where belief and fact 
exhaust the knowledge-maker. I am not asserting that people know hinge propositions 
merely in virtue of belief and fact, just that the fact that knowledge of non-hinge 
propositions requires more than belief and fact, does not establish that knowledge of hinge 
propositions requires more. Whether there are indeed some cases of knowledge that 
depend only on belief and fact is controversial. My view happens to be negative on this 
question, but that is not important here. What is important is that whether or not there are 
such cases cannot be assumed on the basis of a generalization from other cases where more 
is needed. Epistemology textbooks very often argue in such a manner. But given multiple 
realization, the argument is fallacious. 
 
                                                 
14 I speak of facts rather than truth for reasons I give in Zangwill 2013c. 
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§3.2  Multiple Realization and Particularism? 
 
How diverse can the epistemic makers be? Some might worry that we are simply left with 
a list of knowledge-makers with no unifying principle. But the claim that some reduction, 
some unifying principle, must be forthcoming needs defence. If that is thought to be just 
part of epistemology, then epistemology needs a skeptical voice, paralleling Bernard 
Williams’ skepticism about the ambitions of moral theory (Williams 1985). The claim that 
there is always more theoretical understanding to be had is a dubious one, and certainly one 
in need of considerable defence. A different worry might be that multiple realization plus a 
radically diverse view of the realizers of knowledge threatens knowledge of knowledge. In 
principle, yes it does. But so long as knowledge has its typical role, which can be multiply 
instantiated in non-epistemic facts, we can have knowledge of knowledge by knowing that 
typical role. If knowledge had no typical role, then it would indeed be difficult to know. 
 Does embracing multiple realization mean that I am an epistemic ‘particularist’ in the 
sense of Jonathan Dancy (Dancy 1981, 2004)? Much of what I have said about dependence 
and necessity coincides with things that Jonathan Dancy has said, following Michael 
Stocker (Stocker 1970). However, I am not here embracing particularism. Crucial to that 
position is that what may be a maker of a normative fact in one case may be a maker of the 
negation of that normative fact in another case. I am not committed to this strong position. 
It does not follow from multiple realization. Multiple realization is the view that similar 
normative facts may have very different non-normative makers. That is, there are many 
different kinds of non-epistemic makers for any kind of epistemic fact. Normative 
particularism, by contrast, is the view that non-normative facts may vary in the normative 
properties that they contribute to making. According to the idea of multiple realization that 
there are no norm-to-non-norm generalizations, whereas according to the idea of 
particularism there are no non-norm-to-norm generalizations. For example, it could be that 
lying is always pro tanto wrong, and perceptual experience always supplies pro tanto 
justification for belief, although there are other ways to do wrong and other ways for a 
belief to be justified. So multiple ealization does not entail particularism. Furthermore my 
view that the knowledge-maker always includes belief and fact could not be less 
particularist. I endorse Dancy’s views on ‘favoring’, ‘resultance’ and ‘enablers’, but not 
particularism.15 <<terminology?? Particularism vs holism>> 
 
§3.3  Hybrid Skepticism and Multiple Realization 
 
Consider some standard arguments for hybrid skeptical views, views that combine 
                                                 
15 For our concerns, little turns on whether or not knowledge is a ‘mental state’something 
discussed by Timothy Williamson (Williamson 2000). The issue we are interested in is the 
dependence of knowledge, mental state or not, on non-knowledge states. Williamson’s view may 
be that knowledge does not have belief as a part, which might be true but not very interesting if 
mereological notions do not apply to epistemic or mental states. If, however, the thesis is that 
having knowledge never depends in part on having a belief, then it is false. 
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dogmatism with skepticism. According to such views, we know ordinary facts, such as that 
we are sitting on a chair, but we do not know that we are not dreaming, or not a brain in a 
vat, or not deluded by an evil demon. (Prominent examples are Fred Dretske or Robert 
Nozick (Dretske 1970, 1981, Nozick 1981).) Such views are committed to denying 
epistemic closure: one can know one but not the other, despite knowing that one entails the 
other. Let us put to one side the plausibility of these views in order to consider the 
arguments for them. 
 The standard argument for the hybrid view is that a person is said to know one but not 
the other because there is some non-epistemic property, which is the knowledge-maker of 
one case but not the other. For instance, perhaps ‘tracking’ conditions hold in one case but 
not the other. But this argument flouts the multiple realization point. The non-epistemic 
knowledge-maker envisaged by hybridists varies with different theories but the basic 
strategy is common: there is a knowledge-maker that holds in the case of the belief that I 
am sitting on a chair but not in the case of the belief that I am not dreaming. But, given 
multiple realization, what makes us know in one case may be very different from what 
makes us know in another case, despite the fact that what we know in the two cases stands 
in an entailment relation, and we know that. Consider this parallel argument: act A is good 
in virtue of being a case of a promise-keeping, but act B is not a case of promise-keeping, 
so it is not good. We should protest: No!Act B may be good by being a loyal act or by 
being a helping act; there are other ways to be morally good. Similarly, there are many 
ways to be epistemically good. The fact that the belief that I am not dreaming lacks the 
non-epistemic property in virtue of which we know that I am sitting in a chair does not 
show that the belief that I am not dreaming does not have other non-epistemic properties 
that make it knowledge. This is not to say that the hybrid view is incorrect. The point is that 
this common form of argument for hybridism is fallacious because it overlooks multiple 
realization.  
 
§3.4   An Argument for Multiple Realization 
  
To point out that epistemologists often assume the opposite of multiple realization in their 
pursuit of necessary and sufficient conditions, or when they argue for various positions, is 
not to offer a positive argument in favor of multiple realization. What can be positively said 
in favor of multiple realization? Why believe it?  
 In the philosophy of mind in the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers argued for multiple 
realization from the causal role of mental states. It was said that that role could be 
discharged by a variety of physical states. Therefore, they concluded, there are a variety of 
kinds of physical states in which mental states can be realized. It is similar with knowledge. 
We can argue that the role of knowledge is such that a variety of non-epistemic states can 
discharge that role. Hence knowledge can be realized in diverse non-epistemic states. 
What, then, is the role of knowledge? One common role, I suggest, is that knowledge 
makes its possessor ‘reliable’ in the sense that she tends to believe truths and avoid 
falsehoods; roughly the person tends to believe p rather than ~p when p, and the person 
tends to believe ~p rather than p when ~p. In cases where we merely have true belief and do 
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not know, we are not reliable in other similar cases. But if we know, we are reliable in other 
similar cases. Of course, many have thought that reliability, either in this sense, or in the 
sense of having beliefs that are formed by reliable processes, is what knowledge is 
(Goldman 1986); but I propose instead that reliability is a standard role of knowledge. We 
are reliable in virtue of knowledge; they are not the same thing. Perhaps knowledge does 
not universally have that role. But in many cases we are reliable because we know. We can 
know without being reliable (for example in hinge proposition cases, or in flukey cases) 
and yet, when we are reliable, it is usually because we know. The argument from this point 
is that we may be reliable in different ways: in virtue of being justified, in virtue of causal 
relations between beliefs and facts, in virtue of a conjunction of these, in virtue of 
constitutive and essentialist relation in other cases (Zangwill 2013a), and so on. Hence it is 




§4.  Beyond Knowledge 
 
§4.1  Other Epistemic Properties 
 
The foregoing is the main argument of this paper. In this last section I want to show how 
the above points concerning knowledge apply equally to other epistemic phenomena. I 
survey these points briskly. I shall not defend each claim in detail but explore the issues in 
the light of the preceding argument.  
 Consider justification. First, dependence: if someone is justified in believing that p 
then it must be in virtue of something. Something must make her justified. There are 
different views about what supplies justificationperhaps the existence of other beliefs or 
experiences, perhaps coherence with other mental states, perhaps something to which we 
have so-called ‘access’, or perhaps the reliability of belief-forming processes. This is a 
substantive issue. But something makes a belief justified if it is. Second, the 
dependence/sufficiency distinction: the justification-makers (or ‘justifiers’) need not 
suffice for justification. Something may be a justification-maker for a belief even though 
there are many possible defeaters such that, if one of them were instantiated, the belief 
would not be justified. And third, multiple realization: beliefs may be justified in different 
waysperhaps by experience, by coherence with other beliefs, by being self-evident, and 
so on. We should not assume a uniform kind of justification-maker across different cases of 
justified belief.  
 The same goes for other epistemic notions: if a person is intelligent, for example, then 
something must make her intelligent; but what makes her intelligent may not suffice for 
intelligence; and there are different ways to be intelligent. This last was perhaps the point 
of some criticisms of “I.Q.” testing. Intelligence can take different forms and can be 
manifest in different ways. Hence standardized tests for intelligence are likely only to test 
limited kinds of intelligence and exclude others. That is why having just one kind of test is 




§4.2  Epistemic Structure 
 
How are epistemic properties related to each other? Is there a dependency relation among 
different epistemic properties? For example, what is the structural relation between 
knowledge and justification? One view would be that having knowledge depends on in part 
on justification, and that justification-makers do not include knowledge. Another view 
would be that being justified holds partly in virtue of knowing, and that knowledge-makers 
do not include justification. (William Alston argues that they need not in Alston 1989.) 
However, multiple realization is important here, once again. Both views are too dogmatic. 
Some knowledge-makers include justification while others do not. And some 
justification-makers include knowledge and others do not. In many cases, it is clear that 
knowledge-makers include being justified. (Many of Lawrence Bonjour’s Clairvoyance 
cases are like this (Bonjour 1985, chapter 3); the ‘Norman’ case is the exception.) In those 
cases, knowledge holds partly in virtue of justification (that is, x knows that p partly in 
virtue of x’s being justified in believing p). In some cases of knowledge the maker is 
justified true belief, in other cases it is reliably formed true belief, and in yet other cases it is 
justified and reliably formed true belief. There may be cases of non-justified but reliably 
formed true belief, and of unreliably formed but justified true belief that are cases of 
knowledge. They are knowledge, but in a different ways.  
 
§4.3  Coherence 
 
One epistemic fact may depend in part on another, but at some point there must be 
non-epistemic properties. Epistemic facts may be structuredthey may depend on each 
other. But at some point they must hold in virtue of non-epistemic facts. There must be 
non-epistemic makers of epistemic facts.  
 This might be thought to be controversial in that it begs the question against 
coherentism in epistemology. But this is not the case. Suppose that the epistemic structure 
bottoms out in a conjunction of one item of knowledge and one item of justified belief, and 
each of these epistemic facts depends on the other. This is consistent with 
epistemic/non-epistemic dependence. Compare two people who are married: each is the 
spouse of the other; these two properties are mutually dependent even though being 
married, the status both share, depends on various social facts. In the same way, knowledge 
and justification may mutually depend on support each other in some cases and perhaps 
neither would be what it is without the other. Nevertheless both epistemic facts and any 
epistemic facts that they generate in concert, and perhaps only in concert, must depend on 
non-epistemic properties of the beliefs. Thus the principle of epistemic/non-epistemic 
dependence is compatible with a quite strong coherentist conception of the mutual 
dependence of epistemic facts.  
 Is not the dependence relation asymmetrical? Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence is 
non-symmetrical but not asymmetrical. It allows that there can be mutual dependence 
among epistemic facts. Similarly, perhaps rights and duties are inter-dependent, even 
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though both must bottom-out in non-moral properties that make for a marriage of rights 
and duties.  
 Other epistemic properties may be involved in an epistemic structure. A belief might 
be justified partly in virtue of a person being intelligent or she might be intelligent partly in 
virtue of being disposed to form justified beliefs. Or justification and intelligence might be 
mutual dependent. Nevertheless, there must be a non-epistemic basis for being justified 
and being intelligent, even if they work together and a person cannot be justified without 
being intelligent and vice versa.  
 If coherentism is more than this, if it is an assertion of non-dependence, then matters 
are different. That view would be no more plausible than the view that goodness depends 
on obligation, which depends on rightness, and so on foreverthere being nothing 
non-normative in virtue of which any of these hold. Such as view is as unintuitive in 
epistemology as it is in moral philosophy. Furthermore, given the role of knowledge, there 
must, in each case of knowledge, be something non-epistemic that discharges that role. The 
inter-relation of normative facts is one thing, their non-dependence is another.  
 
§Coda: Further Issues 
 
Epistemology needs dependence. Without it, epistemology is confined to a modal 
framework in which to pose its questions, which is either plainly unsatisfactory or at least 
overly limiting. (In my view, few interesting philosophical issues can be posed in a modal 
framework.) There is of course a great deal more to be said about knowledge-, 
justification- and intelligence-makers. These are issues for what we might call 
‘substantive’ epistemology. For example, we might wonder exactly what the link is 
between belief and fact which makes for knowledge in many cases. We might wonder 
whether, in many cases, justification depends in part on experiential states. And perhaps 
intelligence depends in part on certain imaginative capacities. As I have indicated, once we 
recognize the principle of epistemic/non-epistemic dependence, we can raise the issue of 
how different epistemic facts inter-relate: the question of epistemic structure can be 
investigated. Furthermore we can raise issues about skepticism in this framework. Are 
there any positive epistemic fact-makers (see Zangwill 2016)? Although there might be 
both positive and negative epistemic/non-epistemic dependence relations, there might be 
no non-epistemic facts that generate positive epistemic facts, while there are natural facts 
that generate negative epistemic factsso we do not know, are not justified, and are not 
intelligent. What is the relation between positive and negative epistemic properties and 
their makers? There are also issues about closure to be addressed. At its most general and 
simple: can a maker of a positive epistemic fact entail (and be known to entail) a maker of 
a negative epistemic fact? However, that there must be epistemic/non-epistemic 
dependence relations is a matter of a different order from these substantive questions. I 
have tried to isolate that relation, distinguish it from other relations and note what it does 
and does not entail. In particular, we should insist on the distinction between dependence 
and necessitation, and on the compatibility of epistemic/non-epistemic dependence with 
multiple realization. This has many interesting consequences, only some of which I have 
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explored here. Foregrounding the principle of epistemic/non-epistemic dependence 
transforms the way we think and argue about a number of central epistemological 
questions. On the negative side, many arguments in epistemology are subverted. More 
positively, once we are liberated from the necessary and sufficient conditions project, 
many fruitful paths for epistemological investigation open up. * 
 
 
*   Many thanks for comments to Hamid Vahid and Ruth Weintraub. This paper was given 
at Institute of Fundamental Sciences in Tehran, Osaka University, the Forum for Analytic 
Philosophy in Tokyo, Hong Kong University, SADAF and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 
Law school both in Buenos Aires, the Federal University of Santa Caterina in 
Florianopolis, and Padua University. Many thanks to members of these audiences for very 
interesting questions on these occasions, which helped develop this paper. Many thanks, 
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